This paper studies the public sector wage gap in Spain, by gender, skill level and type of contract, using recent administrative data from tax records. We estimate wage distributions in the presence of covariates separately for men and women in the public and in the private sectors, and we take advantage of the longitudinal structure of the data to control for selection. We find a positive public wage premium for men and women even after accounting for characteristics and endogenous selection; the observed average gap in hourly wages of 35 log points is reduced to 20 when accounting for observed characteristics, and to 10 once endogenous selection is also taken into consideration. We also find substantial variation in the public premium along the wage distribution once observed characteristics are accounted for. This variation, however, is offset by opposite patterns of selection into the public sector: while we observe positive selection into the public sector at the bottom of the wage distribution, workers at the top of the distribution select negatively into the public sector.
Introduction
In 2012, more than 15% of the labor force received their wage from the public sector and compensation of employees represented around 30% of Spanish public expenditures. 1 In order to ensure fiscal sustainability under pressure from financial markets, the Spanish Government has undertaken huge fiscal consolidation efforts, and -in particular -the size of the public sector wage bill has been under scrutiny. Indeed, several measures aiming at reducing this public sector wage bill have been already implemented. 2 Under these circumstances, a deep understanding of the public-private wage gap and its distribution seems of paramount importance.
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Public and private sectors workers can be paid differently because of several reasons:
(i) the monopolistic power of governments in the provision of public services results in non-competitive wage settlements (Reder, 1975) ; (ii) the public sector might have different objectives from those of the private sector, for instance, vote maximization rather than profit maximization; (iii) the wage setting environment substantially differs between both sectors, for example, union density is often higher in the public sector and civil servant contracts provide a valuable insurance; (iv) productivity-enhancing characteristics of employees such as education or experience might be different between both sectors. In this paper we argue that the room for cutting public sector wages should be based on the public wage gap due to reasons (i)-(iii) so that we focus on the analysis of the public wage gap not explained by productivity-related characteristics of employees in the two sectors.
Against this background, we analyze the distribution of the public-private wage gap in Spain using recently developed methods for estimating counterfactual distributions (i.e.
Chernozhukov, Fernandez-Val and Melly, 2013; hereinafter, CFVM) combined with fixed effects quantile regressions (Canay, 2011) to account for endogenous selection into the public sector. For that purpose, we use recently released social security data for Spain, which have several advantages compared to the survey-based datasets traditionally used.
These include large sample sizes, complete coverage of the part of the population that is affiliated to the social security administration, and accurate earnings measurements.
We focus on the period 2005-2012, for which the social security dataset has a proper longitudinal design and annual income information from tax records are available for the same individuals as in the social security dataset. 4 On the other hand, the social security dataset do not record hours of work. To overcome this drawback, we match our dataset with information on hours from the Spanish Labor Force Survey.
We find a positive public wage premium for men and women even after accounting for characteristics and endogenous selection; the observed average gap in hourly wages, of around 35%, is reduced to 20% when accounting for observed characteristics, and to 10% once endogenous selection is also taken into consideration. We also find substantial variation in the public premium along the wage distribution once observed characteristics are accounted for; for instance, the public gap for high-skilled men is 18% at the 10 th percentile and -21% at the 90 th percentile. However, this variation is partially offset by different patterns of selection into the public sector, which generate a higher compression of the public wage distribution. Indeed, while we generally observe positive selection into the public sector, high-skilled workers at the top of the distribution select negatively; this negative selection at the top might reflect the inability of the public sector to retain the most skilled workers due to the absence of performance-based mechanisms.
Relation to Literature
Several studies have already analyzed the public -private wage gap in different countries.
Some examples based on average gaps are Smith (1976) or Borjas (2002) for Spain.
5
Another strand of the literature apply quantile regression (QR) methods to analyze the whole distribution of the public-private wage gap in response to the concern raised by the higher compression of the distribution of wages in the public sector. Mueller (1998) used QR to estimate the size of the public sector wage premium for Canada. He found that public sector pay differentials tend to be highest for individuals at the lower tail Finally, there exists a recent strand of the literature that estimates public -private wage gaps controlling for employees' observed and unobservable individual attributes using fixed effects quantile regressions. Bargain and Melly (2008) estimate the public wage gap in France for the period 1990-2002 at the mean and at different quantiles of the wage distribution for both men and women controlling for unobserved heterogeneity.
They find that public sector premia or penalties are indeed much lower than commonly found. In particular, public wage premia for women and penalties for men are the result of the selection of the employees. Campos and Centeno (2012) use data for 15 European countries from the ECHP for the period 1994-2001. They find that estimates for the public-private wage gap based on the fixed effects approach are generally lower than those obtained using the pooled approach. In most countries, sample differences between fixed effects and traditional QR estimates are more obvious at the lower quantiles of the wage distribution, suggesting that the positive selection effect becomes less obvious as one moves up the wage distribution. According to Campos and Centeno (2012) , this means that the observed compression in the public sector wage distribution would be due to selection.
We embed our paper into this latter strand of the literature. In particular, the contribution of this paper is twofold. First, the combination of the CFVM approach (to estimate counterfactual distributions) and the Canay (2011) estimator (to include fixed effects in quantile regressions) allows us to estimate the entire wage distribution accounting for differences in observable characteristicas as well as endogenous selection into the public sector. This approach provides a more complete picture of the public-private wage gap than previous studies based on the inclusion of a public sector dummy in Mincerian regressions using panel quantile approaches, and it also allows a more flexible specification with respect to the heterogeneous effects of observable characteristics on wages depending on the sector.
Second, we use a dataset based on tax records which allows us to overcome a potential drawback of previous empirical studies about the public-private wage gap based on survey data (e.g. the German Socio-Economic Panel, the European Community Household Panel, or the Wage Structure Survey in the Spanish case). Concerns about response errors in survey data and their implications for economic analysis date back to the fifties (e.g. Cohen and Lipstein, 1954; Miller and Paley, 1958) . 6 Moreover, the quality of survey measures of income also represents a concern, several studies (e.g. More recently, using two unique matched worker-employer data files, Mellow and Sider (1983) find that almost one-half of workers surveyed indicate a different detailed occupation than is reported by their employer. Zweimuller (1992) concludes that sample selectivity due to interviewees' refusal to answer to the survey-questionnaire is a significant problem, even of larger importance than the selectivity bias due to non-participation in the labor market. Griliches et al. (1978) , Atkinson and Micklewright (1983) , or Groves (2006) also provide evidence along these lines. 7 Moreover, an additional concern is that reporting biases may follow different patterns between public and private sector workers; while income sources for public sector employees are clearly determined and unambiguously-established, uncertainty surrounding income in the private sector is more important due to, for instance, bonuses or extra hours.
Data
Our main data source is the Continuous Sample of Working Histories (Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales, MCVL, in Spanish). The MCVL is a micro-level dataset built upon Spanish administrative records with detailed information on labor earnings and days worked, in addition to other worker and firm characteristics. It is a representative sample of the population registered with the social security administration at any time in the reference year. The MCVL also has a longitudinal design. From 2005 to 2012, those individuals who are present in a wave and subsequently remain registered with the social security administration stay as sample members. In addition, the sample is refreshed with new sample members so it remains representative of the population in each wave. Finally, the MCVL tries to reconstruct the market labor histories of the individuals in the sample back to 1967. Besides the MCVL, we will use annual income information from tax files that have been matched to the social security sample. Contrary to the social security measure of labor earnings that is top-(and bottom-) coded, tax records are not subject to censoring. In addition, as mentioned before, the MCVL does not record hours of work. Hence, in order to compute a hourly wage measure, we combine the daily earnings from administrative records with information on hours of work from the Spanish Labor Force Survey (Encuesta de Población Activa, EPA, in Spanish).
Sample Selection
The population of reference of the MCVL consists of all individuals registered with the social security administration, including pension earners, recipients of unemployment benefits, employees and self-employed workers, but excluding those registered only as medical care recipients, or those with a different social assistance system. The raw data represents a 4 per cent non-stratified random sample of this reference population. It consists of nearly 1.1 million individuals each year.
We use data from working individuals in the 2005-2012 MCVL original samples with Tax Information. 8 We select prime-age employees enrolled in the General Regime of the Social Security Administration at any time in the sample period. 9 To ensure that we only consider income from wage sources, we exclude self-employees from our sample. We also exclude individuals younger than 25 and older than 54 years to avoid to get mixed with formal education enrollments issues and early retirement decisions, respectively.
8 Basque Country and Navarra are excluded, because they enjoy a different system known as the Economic accord. 9 In Spain, more than 90 per cent of the employees affiliated to the Social Security Administration are enrolled in the general scheme (for instance, in 2009 that proportion was 92,1 per cent). Separate schemes exist for domestic workers, some workers in fishing, mining and agricultural activities, and some government employees, such as the armed forces, the judicial power or MUFACE (Mutualidad General de Funcionarios Civiles del Estado).
In the empirical analysis, we use individual log hourly wages as our main dependent variable. To recover the information on hours of work from the EPA, we define cells given by year, age, gender, level of qualification, sector of activity, tenure in the firm, type of contract (fixed-term vs. open-ended), type of work schedule (full-time vs. part-time), and region. For each cell in the EPA, we compute the average number of usual weekly hours of work, and then we impute that number to those individuals belonging to an equally defined cell in the MCVL dataset. Then we divide those hours by 5 to obtain daily hours of work. With this procedure, we have been able to merge 88 per cent of the observations from our MCVL raw sample. Hourly wages are computed as the individual annual labor income from the tax record, divided by the individual annual days of work from the social security records and the average number of daily hours obtained from the corresponding cell in EPA.
Provided dispersion of hours worked is larger in the private sector, the imputation of cell-specific average hours may artificially increase the relative variance of hourly wages in the private sector. Figure A .1 in Appendix A plots the overall distribution of daily hours worked in both sectors illustrating that hours in the private sector present thicker tails and larger dispersion. 10 However, this overall distribution might be contaminated by composition effects because it does not condition on the different characteristics of the public-private workforce as we do in our cell-based imputation. We thus compare withincell distributions in both sectors and observe that within-cell dispersion of hours in the private sector is larger than that of the public sector but this difference is not statistically significant. In particular, the average within-cell standard deviation of daily hours are 
Definition of Public Employees
In our dataset public employees refer to those workers from either the central administration, the regional governments or the local corporations, as well as those working in public firms. 11 However, some public employees who belong to social assistance systems different to the General Regime of the Social Security Administration are not included.
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10 Standard deviation is 1.95 for the private sector and 1.21 for the public sector. Moreover, the mean is 7.5 in the private sector and 7.2 in the public sector.
11 The dataset includes two variables that allow us to distinguish workers in the public sector to those in the private sector: one from the point of view of the worker (so-called employee type), and another from the firm's perspective (type of legal entity). The results presented in the paper correspond to the first definition. We also use the second definition as a robustness check, and the results do not change. 12 According to the 2012 report of those mutual societies, their active members by the end of 2012 amounted to 971,104 people. Given the size of the Public Administration in the EPA for the fourth According to our dataset, in Spain 15 per cent of employees work in the public sector (see Table 1 ). In the case of women the incidence is higher (20 per cent), almost doubles the corresponding share for men (11 per cent). By skill groups, 13 we obtain that the share of public employees is higher among high-skilled relatively to less skilled workers. One particular feature of the Spanish case is the high proportion of public employees among workers with fixed-term contracts (more than 31 per cent for women). The evolution of those shares over time, as shown in Figure 1 For men, the increase in the share was from 10.1 to 11.9, and then it decreases to 10.5 per cent, while in the case of women, the corresponding numbers are 20.3, 21.2, and 18.0, respectively.
A First Glimpse of the Data: Raw Wage Gaps
According to Table 2 , annual earnings are on average 34 per cent higher in the public sector than in the private sector over the period. However, part of this raw gap is due to the different labor force composition of the two sectors. As reported in the Table A.2 of quarter of 2012, this would mean that about one third of public sector employees belong to social assistance systems different to the General Regime of the Social Security Administration, and hence are not included in our sample (Montesinos et al. 2014) . This would represent a concern if the subgroup of public employees in MUFACE are for instance different to the overall group of public employees in characteristics that we do not take into account in our analysis. As an additional robustness check, we consider separately the group of public employees who are civil servants, given that this condition is a requirement to be registered in MUFACE. Results are shown in Figure A. 2 of the Appendix A. We can see that in the raw data, civil servants have higher wages relative to private workers than public employees in general along the whole distribution. However, once we condition in observed characteristics, the differences in the public sector wage gaps are less pronounced. 13 In Spain, each worker affiliated to the social security is assigned to one of the ten contribution groups (for instance, Group 1 corresponds to workers with university degree). In particular, we label a worker as high-skilled (groups 1-3), medium-skilled (groups 4-7), or low-skilled (groups 8-10). Appendix A, public employees are on average older, more skilled, have longer tenure and work more on a full-time basis. On the other hand, they have temporary contracts in a higher proportion. In addition, the gap in annual earnings includes differences in the total number of days worked in a year, and in the number of hours worked per day. On the one hand, the number of annual days of work is on average higher in the public sector. Given that, the raw public sector wage gap is lower in a daily basis than in annual terms (27% versus 34%). On the other, employees in the public sector work on average less hours than those in the private sector (7.3 and 7.6 hours per day, respectively), being then the public sector hourly wage gap on average equal to 31.7%. By gender, we obtain that the raw wage premium in the public sector is higher for females than for males (39.7% and 30.8%, respectively). Also, in the case of women, the average public wage gap is lower in a hourly basis than in a daily basis because daily hours of work are higher in the public sector due to the prevalence of part-time contracts in the private sector (see Table A .2). Figure 2 shows the evolution of the public sector wage gap over time. We can see that Behind those differences by gender in the average public sector wage gap there are very different profiles along the wage distribution. As shown in Figure 3 , for men we observe an inverse V-shaped pattern, whereas for women the profile is more compressed and similar to an inverse U. Over time, those profiles have changed in terms of the level and only recently also in their shapes; in particular, the change in the shapes in 2012 might be explained by the wage moderation process in the aftermath of the crisis, which seems to be especially important for private sector workers at the bottom of the wage distribution. Next, we consider the public sector wage gap in the presence of covariates -first in the mean and next over the entire wage distribution -in order to isolate the part of the gap due to differences in the remunerations to those observed characteristics. Finally, we perform the same decomposition exercise while also accounting for time-invariant unobserved characteristics, i.e., endogenous selection into the public sector. Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) proposed to decompose the difference in average earnings between public and private workers into a explained component given by differences in characteristics and an unexplained component given by differences in coefficients. Formally, let y i be the individual i's log hourly wage in real terms (in a given year, or in the pooled data for the whole period). We denote Public ≡ 1 and Private ≡ 0, so that we consider the following regressions for each sector:
where x i is the set of covariates in each case. Letz = N −1 i z i be a sample mean, and x 1 β 0 a counterfactual wage that measures the average wage we would observe if public workers would be paid as private workers. Then, the average difference in wages between the two sectors is:
This simple derivation allow us to decompose the average difference between wages in the public and private sectors in two components: the characteristics effect (an explained component given by differences in composition), and the coefficients effect (an unexplained component given by differences in returns).
Results
In Table 3 we present estimates of the coefficients effect, that is, the difference in average log hourly wages between public and private workers once the effects of differences in characteristics is net out. We show estimates for the whole period, in column 1 pooling men and women, and in columns 2 and 3 for each of them separately. With respect to the vector of covariates (x i ), we consider three different specifications: first, we consider those variables often included in Mincerian models, namely, age, age squared, skill-groups, time and regional dummies; second, we add indicators for tenure in the firm (less than 1 year, between 1 and 2 years, between 2 and 4, between 4 and 7, between 7 and 15, and more than 15 years), the type of contract (permanent or fixed-term vs. temporary or open-ended), and the type of work schedule (full-time vs. part-time); and finally, we also include firm size as an additional categorical variable (less than 10 employees, 10-50, 50-200, more than 200). 14 We find that for an overall raw difference of 0.35 log points, between 0.12 and 0.15 log points (depending of the specification) are explained by differences in observed characteristics of public and private workers. However, there is still almost one half of the difference that remains unexplained. For men, the raw log difference is 0.35 and at least 53 per cent of the difference is due to the coefficients effect. For women, the raw difference is higher (0.40) but again the fraction unexplained is around one half of it. In Figure 4 we show the raw differences and the estimates of the coefficients effect from Specification 3 -overall and by gender -for each year. We find that the raw log difference increases from 0. 35 14 These models correspond to specification 1, 2 and 3, respectively, in subsequent tables and figures. For regressions that pool men and women together we add a female indicator. Coefficient estimates of these regressions are available upon request. 
Counterfactual Distributions
The popular Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition only provides information about average differences. However, statistical measures of the public-private wage gap based on average effects might mask important differences along the distribution of wages.
Since Koenker and Bassett (1978) the quantile regression approach has became relatively popular to study the effects of a covariate (X) on the whole conditional distribution of the dependent variable (Y ). Quantile regression provides a more complete picture of the conditional distribution of Y given X = x when both lower and upper quantiles are of interest. More concretely, we can specify the θth quantile of the conditional distribution of y i given X i as a linear function of the covariates,
The quantile regression estimator of β θ estimates the effect of the covariates on the θth quantile of the dependent variable and solves the following problem (Koenker and Bassett, 1978):
Given the quantile regression approach just discussed, we can now present the details on the generalization of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition to the whole distribution of wages based on CFVM. In particular, we can proceed in seven steps:
Step 1. Quantile regressions: We separately run two different sets of quantile regressions, one for the public sector (group 1) and one for the private sector (group 0) to obtain the two sequences of quantile coefficientsβ 
16
Step 2. Conditional quantile functions: Given the quantile regression coefficients obtained in the first step, it is straightforward to estimate the θ j 's conditional quantile of
where g = (0, 1) represents the group (public or private workers). Hence we can construct the two conditional quantile functions as follows:
Step 3. Conditional distribution functions: We can also estimate the conditional distribution function by inverting the conditional quantile function obtained in step 2 so that:
where F Y (q) refers to the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the random variable Y evaluated at q, F −1 Y (θ) represents the inverse of the CDF, also known as quantile function evaluated at 0 < θ < 1, and F Y (q|X i ) refers to the conditional CDF of Y evaluated at q and given the realization X = X i .
Step 4. Unconditional distribution functions: Therefore, we can now estimate the unconditional distribution function for public (g = 1) and private (g = 0) workers as follows:F
where n 1 and n 0 are the number of public and private workers in the sample. 16 In finite samples, Portnoy (1991) shows that given the set of points in which the vector of coefficients changes (θ 0 = 0, θ 1 , ..., θ J = 1), the coefficients estimateβ θj prevails in the interval from θ j−1 to θ j . 17 Note that since the estimated quantile function might not be monotonic, we need to resort to the following property of the CDF:
Step 5. Unconditional quantile functions: Given our interest in simulating counterfactual quantiles to decompose differences in the distribution of wages, we estimate the unconditional quantile function. For this purpose we take as an estimator of the θ th quantile of the unconditional distribution from step 4 the minimum of the set as follows:
Step 6. Counterfactual quantile functions: Armed with the previous function estimates, we are now able to estimate the counterfactual quantile function. That is, we estimate the θ th quantile of the distribution that we would observe if public workers (g = 1) would be paid as private workers (g = 0):
where n 1 is the number of public workers in the sample. Note that for the construction of the conditional distributionF Y 0 (q|X i ) we used in step 3 the coefficients estimated for the private workers, i.e.,β 0 θ ; and we are computing the counterfactual quantile using the Xs among public workers, i.e., sum over individuals with g = 1. This counterfactual distribution is an interesting object per se that will deserve special attention in our empirical exercises.
Step 7. Decomposition: Analogously to the Blinder-Oaxaca approach for the mean,
we can now compute a decomposition of the difference between the θ th quantile of the unconditional distribution of public and private workers:
Results
Similarly to the comparison before at the mean, now we compare the estimated percentiles of the total public sector logwage gap,q 1 θ −q 0 θ , with the corresponding ones once the contribution of different characteristics has been net out (that is, the coefficients effectq
18 Figure 5 shows those percentiles by gender for the three specifications considered.
The solid lines stand for the estimated total wage gaps, while the dashed lines correspond to the estimated wage gaps once the contribution of the sample composition has been net out. Table 4 summarizes point estimates at selected quantiles. In the case of the conditional mean, as reported in Table 3 , we obtained that around half of the public sector raw wage gap was explained by differences in observable characteristics. Similarly, as reported in Table 4 , we find that if workers in the private and in the public sectors had the same characteristics, the public sector wage gap along the wage distribution would be significantly lower, especially at the top. In fact, for men in the upper-part of the distribution, the positive wage gap practically disappears (the gap ranges 0.054-0.064 depending on the specification). This means that a substantial fraction of the public sector gap is due to the fact that public employees are in general better in terms of covariates than private sector employees. The table also shows that the three specifications perform similarly in terms of the fit (which is remarkably good), and that the three offer similar estimates of the unconditional quantiles. Results from here onwards are all obtained using specification 3.
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With respect to the evolution of the public sector wage gap over time, to easy the presentation and analyses of results, we focus on two particular years: 2008 and 2012. Figure 6 shows the percentiles of the two public sector wage gaps (total -solid lines; and coefficients -dashed lines) by gender for those two years. From 2008 to 2012 we see that the public sector raw wage gap has decreased substantially both for men and women, with the only exception of the 10th percentile. Once the 18 These estimates are based on quantile regressions presented in Appendix B.1. 19 Given the huge sample size we consider there is not need to include standard errors in the tables or figures. To illustrate this point Figure A .3 in Appendix A shows how tight are the confidence intervals in the case of a 5 per cent random draw of the sample that we use. Standard errors are computed by bootstrap and the computational burden is very high. 20 Results from the two other specifications are available upon request. 
Results by Subgroups of Workers
We now consider two different subgroups of workers. We first consider workers by skill groups, distinguishing between high, medium and low skilled individuals. Second, we separate workers by type of contract, that is, those workers with a permanent contract versus those with a fixed-term or temporary position. Figure 7 shows the percentiles of the public sector wage gaps by gender and skill level. As previously, the solid lines stand for the estimated total wage gaps, while the dashed lines correspond to the estimated wage gaps once the contribution of the sample composition has been net out. For high-skilled and medium-skilled workers the total gap is decreasing along the distribution of wages, whereas for low-skilled workers the slope is positive in the bottom half of the distribution and flat or slightly negative in the upper part. Once we condition on observables, we find that if high-skilled male workers in the private and in the public sectors had the same characteristics, the public sector wage gap would be negative already at the median. For high-skilled women is always positive, but substantially lower. For medium and low-skilled male workers the role of characteristics is rather limited. Finally, for medium and low-skilled female workers the conditional public sector wage premium is higher than the total gap for observationally comparable individuals.
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In order to see the evolution over time, we report in Figure A For workers with a permanent contract the public sector raw wage gap is in general decreasing, while -on the contrary -for temporary male workers the raw gap increases as wages also increase, and for temporary women it remains flat. Once composition is taken into consideration, the gap for indefinite positions falls in a parallel fashion, similarly to the case of women in temporary positions, whereas for men the gap adopts a concave 
The Role of Unobservables
In this section, we analyze the role of workers' unobserved characteristics on both wages and selection into the public sector. A natural concern in the gaps analyzed so far is that workers are not randomly selected into one sector or the other, even after accounting for observed characteristics. Indeed, this concern has been traditionally addressed in the literature by using instrumental variable methods at the mean (see e.g. Moulton, 1990 ). Alternatively, we rely on the panel dimension of our dataset and take into account the role of unobservables and selection by including individual-specific effects at different points of the wage distribution.
The panel approach to account for selection of workers into the public sector is also advocated by Bargain and Melly (2008) and Campos and Centeno (2012) . In these studies, the public-private wage gap is estimated by including a public dummy variable in panel quantile regressions with fixed effects (FE). In contrast, we consider the panel quantile approach proposed by Canay (2011) combined with the CFVM method to estimate counterfactual distribution. In practice, we first estimate the individual effects using FE OLS using the full sample of workers but relying in switchers for identification.
22 Second, we compute transformed log hourly wages by subtracting the estimated effects from the observed log hourly wages. Third, we apply traditional quantile regression to these transformed wages to both subsamples separately (public and private) within the CFVM setting. Therefore, we allow a more flexible empirical specification with respect to the heterogeneous effects of observable characteristics on wages depending on the sector. As a robustness check, we consider a panel regression with heteroskedastic errors that also features quantile-specific heterogeneity in the estimated public-private wage gaps.
Longitudinal Approach
Public-private wage gaps along the wage distribution are computed on the basis of the CFVM methodology outlined above. However, in order to account for unobserved characteristics possibly affecting both wages and selection, we utilize a different estimation strategy in the first step of the approach. In particular, instead of running standard quan- Table A .3 in Appendix A reports the proportion of people switching from one sector to the other each year. The table also contains some descriptive information for those who move relative to those who stay in the same sector. Although relying on those movers for identification is quite standard in the literature, it is important to keep in mind that they differ in relevant dimensions relative to the whole population.
given the huge sample sizes in the cross-sectional dimension of our dataset. Against this background, Canay (2011) proposes a panel quantile estimator allowing for fixed effects correlated with the regressors that is simple to compute. The key assumption for identification is that the individual effects affect all quantiles in the same way (i.e. the fixed effects are treated as location shift variables); intuitively, if the fixed effects are interpreted as a time invariant regressor (e.g. ability), this assumption implies that the coefficient on this regressor is constant across quantiles.
More formally, Canay (2011) considers the following model:
where X it is the set of covariates and α i represents the individual-specific effect assumed to operate as a simple location shifter of the conditional distribution of y it .
For estimating the model in (9), Canay (2011) proposes a two-step procedure. First, we estimate the individual heterogeneity parameters (α i ) using a √ N T −consistent estimator of β µ in the conditional mean equation for y it :
In a second step, the standard quantile regression approach (Koenker and Bassett, 1978 ) can be applied to the transformed dependent variableŷ it ≡ y it −α i as follows:
Given the fixed effects estimates in (11), we can compute the public-private wage gaps following the CFVM approach as described in Section 4.1 but consideringŷ it instead of y it as the dependent variable. In Appendix B.2 we present and discuss these fixed effects quantile coefficient estimates.
The consistency of the Canay (2011) approach relies on large T asymptotics, which may be a reason of concern in our small T application. Therefore, in Section 5.4 we explore an alternative specification based on panel quantile regressions with fixed effects and heteroskedastic errors. This approach produces heterogeneous public-private gaps along the wage distribution without requiring large T for consistency.
Results
We now present the public-private gaps at different points of the wage distribution combining the Canay (2011) panel quantile approach and the CFVM methodology on counterfactual distributions as described above. 24 Figure 9 shows the observed gaps at different 23 See Canay (2011) for a more detailed discussion on the estimator and its asymptotic properties. 24 These estimates are based on quantile regressions presented in Appendix B.2.
quantiles together with the unexplained gap using quantile regression on pooled data (i.e. assuming exogenous selection into the public sector) and the unexplained gap using fixed effects quantile regression (i.e. allowing for endogenous sector choice on the basis of unobserved characteristics). Interestingly enough, the shape of the public wage mark-up substantially changes once unobserved heterogeneity (i.e. endogenous selection)
is accounted for; the decreasing profile for women and the inverted-U-shaped profile for men become roughly flat in both cases, and thus the compression partly disappears after controlling for selection on unobservables. This finding, also found by Bargain and Melly (2008) for France, cast doubt on the conventional wisdom that the compression of the public wage distribution is due to noncompetitive wage settlements. Instead, the higher compression of the wage distribution in the public sector might be explained, at least partially, by selection. Therefore, traditional explanations for the shape and size of the public wage gap (e.g. larger influence of trade unions) should be complemented with the potentially important role of workers' unobserved characteristics, which substantially differ between the public and private sector. Indeed, Figure 10 plot the average at each quantile of the estimated fixed effects for both public and private workers; these estimates clearly point to positive selection of both men and women into the public sector at all the percentiles considered (note that this result does not hold for high-skilled workers as discussed below). In Figure 11 , we present the evolution over time of the public wage gaps discussed above for the whole sample period. Figure 12 shows the percentiles of the public sector wage gaps by gender and skill level.
Results by Subgroups of Workers
Solid, dashed, and dotted lines correspond to total gaps, gaps once observed characteristics are accounted for, and gaps once endogenous selection into the public sector is accounted for, respectively. The non-standard results discussed above (i.e. the increasing profile of the wage gap for low-skilled workers) disappear once we account for unobserved heterogeneity simultaneously affecting selection into the public sector and wages. Indeed, in all cases, the profile of the wage gap becomes roughly flat confirming that the compression in the public wage distribution partly disappears after controlling for selection on unobservables.
Interestingly enough, our results point to positive selection into the public sector for medium-and low-skilled workers but also indicate negative selection for high-skilled workers at the top of the wage distribution. Figure 13 illustrates this finding; the estimated fixed effects for high-skilled public workers are lower than those for their private-sector counterparts at the top of the distribution. One possible interpretation would be that the negative selection at the top is the result of the inability of the public sector to retain the most skilled workers. The scarcity of explicit incentives (i.e. performance-based mechanisms) in the public sector might be at the root of this incapacity to retain the most skilled workers. For instance, Burgess and Ratto (2003) review international evidence and find that explicit incentives, and especially payments depending on performance, are typically under-used in the public sector. However, other explanations might also be possible. Differences across the estimated fixed effects for high-skilled workers may be the result of differences in laziness between public and private workers that depend on the skill level as found by Dur and Zoutenbier (2014), or differences in risk aversion between private and public workers as documented by Bonin et al. (2007) .
Analogously to Figure 12 , Figure A .7 in Appendix A presents the results by type of contract. As before, accounting for observed characteristics on pooled data (i.e. under the assumption of exogenous selection into the public sector) results in a decreasing profile of the wage gap for permanent workers and a slightly increasing pattern for temporary workers. In line with the flattening of the gaps estimated above when accounting for worker-specific unobserved characteristics, both temporary and permanent workers present a lower and flatter wage gap once endogenous selection is taken into account.
While in both cases there is evidence of positive selection into the public sector, this result appears to be more marked in the case of permanent workers. 
Robustness Analysis
A natural concern with the approach above is that the small T dimension of our data renders the estimated wage gaps misleading due to finite sample biases in the Canay (2011) estimator. Indeed, Arellano and Weidner (2015) argue that this type of biases might reduce the variability in the estimated quantile-specific coefficients. This concern is especially relevant for us because it would artificially reduce the heterogeneity of the public-private wage gaps along the distribution, our main finding once we account for unobserved heterogeneity.
In order to further investigate this issue, we consider an alternative specification that produces heterogeneity in quantile-specific wage gaps but it does not require large T samples for consistency. To be more concrete, we include the public dummy in panel quantile regressions with fixed effects and heteroskedastic errors. Since the variance of the shocks depends on the public status dummy, quantile regressions in this setting result in percentile-specific wage gaps. Formally, we consider the following model:
where y it is the log-hourly wage, it ∼ N (0, 1), D it is a dummy variable for public sector workers, and X it is a vector of covariates. Given the model in (13), we can estimate the θth quantile of the distribution of y given X and D as follows:
where Φ is the standard normal CDF; the estimated public sector wage gap (α + δΦ −1 (θ)) depends on the different quantiles with the coefficient δ capturing the shape of the gap along the distribution. We compare this gap with the one based on the Canay (2011) estimator combined with the CFVM approach (the so-called Coef. Panel gap). Moreover, we can also estimate the gaps using the heteroskedatic-based approach but without controlling for unobserved heterogeneity (i.e. we do not include η i and recover the so-called Coef gap), and without controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and observable characteristics (i.e. we include neither X it nor η i and obtain the so-called Total gap). 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we use recently released social security data to analyze the public-private wage gap in Spain. We estimate wage distributions in the presence of covariates separately for men and women in the public sector and in the private sector. Moreover, we take advantage of the longitudinal structure of the data to control for endogenous selection into the public sector. Armed with these estimates, we decompose the public sector wage gap along the wage distribution and isolate the part due to differences in the remunerations of both observable and time-invariant unobserved characteristics.
We find a positive public wage premium for men and women even after accounting for characteristics and endogenous selection; the observed average gap in hourly wages, of around 35%, is reduced to 20% when accounting for observed characteristics, and to 10% once endogenous selection is also taken into consideration. We also find substantial variation in the public premium along the wage distribution once observed characteristics are accounted for. However, this variation is partially offset by different patterns of selection into the public sector, which generate a higher compression of the public wage distribution. Indeed, while we generally observe positive selection into the public sector, high-skilled workers at the top of the distribution select negatively; this negative selection at the top might reflect the inability of the public sector to retain the most skilled workers due to the absence of performance-based mechanisms. 
A Additional information

B Quantile Regression Coefficients
In this Appendix, we present some estimates of the quantile regression coefficients for each group -public and private-based on both pooled and panel approaches. These pooled and fixed-effects quantile regressions represent the first step in the counterfactual decompositions reported in subsections 4.2 and 5.2, respectively.
B.1 Pooled Quantile Regressions
Our dependent variable (y i ) is individual i's log hourly wage in real terms. With respect to the vector of covariates (X i ), we consider three different specifications: first, we consider those variables often included in Mincerian models, namely, age, age squared, skill-groups, time and regional dummies; second, we add indicators for tenure in the firm (less than 1 year, between 1 and 2 years, between 2 and 4, between 4 and 7, between 7 and 15, and more than 15 years), the type of contract (fixed-term vs. open-ended), and the type of work schedule (full-time vs. part-time); and finally, we also include firm size as an additional categorical variable (less than 10 employees, 10-50, 50-200, more than 200). We present estimates of quantile regression coefficients by gender for selected quantiles, a particular specification and for the pooled sample of the whole period 2005-2012. We have conducted separate quantile regressions for every year as well. Results in coefficient estimates do not change much when we consider different years, or alternative specifications.
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In particular, Table B .1 presents the estimation results for specification 3 and five different quantiles -10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th-of the wage distribution for private (columns 1-5) and public (columns 6-10) male workers. Similarly, Table B .2 presents the estimation results for females.
The age-earnings profiles are concave both in the public and the private sectors (only the top quantiles for women in the public sector do not present such a concave profile).
We now analyze the differences in "returns to schooling" across the wage distribution in both the private and the public sector. Our coefficient estimates, both for males and females, point to one striking difference between the public and the private sector; while the return to education in general increases with the quantile considered in the private sector, this is not the case in the public sector. This also implies that only at the top of the distribution returns to education are higher in the private sector (competitive) than in the public sector (non-competitive). In contrast, at the bottom of the distribution the return to education is always higher in the public sector. We also find that in the private sector, the profile of returns for low-skilled positions is flatter relative to high and medium-skilled jobs. In addition, for women in the private sectors the profile of returns is less steep than the one for men. In fact, for women in low skilled occupations the return to education also decreases with the quantile in the private sector.
The effect of working part-time on hourly wages is generally positive and, for women, slightly larger in the public sector. 27 On the other hand, temporary contracts in the private sector have a wage penalty for men, whereas for women the penalty is only present in the bottom-half of the distribution. For females with a temporary contract in the private sevtor, the wage premium in the upper-part increases along the wage distribution, reaching a maximum of 15.1% at the 90th percentile. In contrast, workers -both men and women -with a temporary contract earn significantly less than permanent workers in the public sector at all quantiles.
Regarding firm size, we find negative wage effects of working in smaller firms both 26 They are available upon request. 27 Only at the 10th quantile the part-time effect is negative in both sectors.
in the private and in the public sector. However those penalties increase along the wage distribution in the private sector, whereas in the public sector the penalty is less as we move up in the distribution. Finally, the last row in Tables B.1 and B. 2 presents the p-values of a joint test of all public-private interactions, clearly pointing to the existence of a different wage determination process in the public sector.
B.2 Quantile Regressions with Fixed Effects
We consider the same Mincer-type equation by quantile as in the previous section but accounting for individual-specific effectsà la Canay (2011) The age profile is still concave in all cases but decreasing returns begin earlier once unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account. Moreover, the increasing age-returns last longer in the private sector. For instance, for males at the 50th percentile the maximum is reached at 41 years in the private sector, while their public counterparts reach the maximum at the age of 36 years; these figures are 77 and 50 for females in the private and public sectors.
Turning to "returns to schooling" the magnitude of the schooling premium is always smaller once unobserved heterogeneity is accounted for. For instance, the premium for group 1 (with respect to group 10, the omitted category) male workers in the private sector is 86.7% at the 50th percentile in the pooled case, while it is only 24.9% once fixed effects are included in the model; these premia in the public sector are 76.8% and 31.4% respectively. Interestingly enough, the striking difference between public and private returns' profile along the wage distribution remains unaltered: while the return to education in general increases with the quantile considered in the private sector, this is not the case in the public sector. However, in contrast to the pooled specification, returns to schooling are generally larger in the public sector, even at the top of the wage distribution; this difference between pooled and fixed effects estimates might be at the root of the flatter wage gaps estimated under the fixed effects specification.
The effect of working part-time is now positive in all cases while it was negative for males and females at the bottom of the distribution. Moreover, the part-time effect is always larger once fixed effects are accounted for. One rationale for this finding is that the prevalence of part-time contracts is substantially higher among workers with lower fixed effects.
Finally, the effects of tenure and size firm are always smaller in magnitude using the fixed effects specification, but the profiles along the distribution as well as the differences between public and private sectors remain the same as in the pooled specification discussed above. 
